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A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to improve the trading prospects
of developing countries. The 2001 declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
commits the member governments to negotiations aimed at substantial improvements in market access
with a view to phasing out export subsidies, while embracing “special and differential treatment” for
developing countries as an integral part of all elements of the negotiations. The main message of this
paper comes in three parts. First, these stated aims are incompatible from the perspective of our economic
analysis; thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver
the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks. Second, in attempting
to integrate its developing country membership into the world trading system, the WTO may face
a “latecomers” problem that, while occurring also in earlier rounds, is unprecedented in its scale in
the Doha Round, and which could potentially account for the current impasse. And third, we argue
that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the non-reciprocal special-and-differential
treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO,
and if developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table
and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible
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A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations is
to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. Toward this objective, the declaration
from the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, November 14, 2001, states in part:
“We commit ourselves to comprehensive negotiations aimed at: substantial improve-
ments in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export
subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. We agree
that special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries shall be an integral part
of all elements of the negotiations...”.
Currently, the Doha Round is approaching the end of its 10th year of negotiations, and the Round
seems unlikely to conclude in the foreseeable future with an agreement that achieves its fundamental
objectives.
What can account for the lack of progress in the Doha Round? Are there changes in the
approach to negotiations that was endorsed at Doha that might help to break the current impasse?
In this paper, we extract insights from the standard economic theory of trade agreements to provide
answers to these questions. Our main message comes in three parts.
First, the stated aims of the Doha Round are incompatible from the perspective of our economic
analysis. Thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we conclude that they are unlikely to deliver
the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that the WTO membership seeks.
Second, after 50 years of successful developed-country liberalization under GATT (the WTO’s
predecessor), the WTO may face a “latecomers” problem as it attempts to integrate its developing
country membership into the world trading system, wherein its developed country members face a
kind of “globalization fatigue” and have insuﬃcient bargaining power in the negotiations relative
to developing country members. While this problem also arose in earlier GATT rounds, its scale
in the Doha Round is unprecedented, and it could potentially account for the current impasse.
And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but moves away from the non-
reciprocal special-and-diﬀerential treatment norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting
developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare, in markets where
they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with each other and
with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha, to address the
latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.
To make these points, we rely on a series of simple general equilibrium and partial equilibrium
trade models. For the most part, we illustrate the message delivered by these models with the use
of schematic ﬁgures, providing references to the existing literature for more complete and formal
treatments. And we support our use of the models with reference to the relevant empirical research.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we consider the implications
of special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries in the context of a negotiating forum
where developed countries engage in reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariﬀ bargaining. In section
13 we turn to an analysis of the Doha approach to agriculture negotiations. Section 4 considers how
the Doha Round might be made a development round according to the economic analysis contained
in the previous sections. Finally, section 5 oﬀers a brief conclusion. A Data Appendix includes a
number of tables not included in the main body of the paper.
2 Non-reciprocal negotiations and developing countries
A key objective of the current Doha Round of GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations is to
bring developing countries into the world trading system. A wide range of anecdotal and empir-
ical evidence suggests that developing countries have gained little if at all from more than half
a century of GATT/WTO-sponsored tariﬀ negotiations. For example, based on interviews with
WTO delegates and Secretariat staﬀ members, Jawara and Kwa (2003, p. 269) oﬀer the following
assessment:
“Developed countries are beneﬁtting from the WTO, as are a handful of (mostly
upper) middle-income countries. The rest, including the great majority of developing
c o u n t r i e s ,a r en o t .I ti sa ss i m p l ea st h a t . ”
The empirical ﬁndings of Subramanian and Wei (2007) are also consistent with this position. They
ﬁnd that GATT/WTO membership is associated with a large and signiﬁcant increase in trade vol-
umes for developed countries; however, for developing country members, the impact of membership
on trade volumes is weak or non-existent.1
One fact to keep in mind is that, while developed countries have negotiated deep reductions
in their nondiscriminatory “most-favored-nation” (MFN) tariﬀs under GATT auspices, developing
countries have committed to few tariﬀ cuts over the 8 GATT multilateral negotiating rounds that
span 50 years. In the Data Appendix we reproduce four relevant tables taken from the WTO World
Trade Report for 2007. Table 5 records the impressive overall results from 60 years of negotiated
tariﬀ reductions under GATT and the ﬁrst decade of the WTO (created in 1995 as a result of the
Uruguay Round). Table 9 then conﬁrms that these overall results mask a striking lack of tariﬀ
commitments (“binding coverage”) for developing countries prior to the last completed (Uruguay)
GATT round, while Appendix Tables 8 and 9 record the much more signiﬁcant tariﬀ bindings made
by developed countries over the GATT years.2 The asymmetry in GATT/WTO tariﬀ commitments
across developed and developing countries is a result of the exception to the reciprocity norm that
has been extended to developing countries and codiﬁed under “special and diﬀerential treatment,”
or SDT, clauses. This exception was thought to ensure that developing countries would get a “free
1This particular ﬁnding of Subramanian and Wei (2007), that it is mainly large developed countries that have
enjoyed signiﬁcant trade eﬀects of GATT/WTO membership, is conﬁrmed for example in Chang and Lee (2011),
and also by Eicher and Henn (2011) once controls suggested by the “terms-of-trade theory” of trade agreements are
introduced (we describe this theory more fully below).
2Moreover, as is well known (see for example Diakantoni and Escaith, 2009), even the impressive binding coverage
for less developed countries achieved in the Uruguay Round is potentially misleading, because a large proportion of
those bindings were set signiﬁcantly above the tariﬀ rates actually applied by these countries.
2pass” on the MFN tariﬀ cuts that the developed countries negotiated with one another, allowing
developing country exporters to then share with exporters from developed countries in the beneﬁts
of greater MFN access to developed country markets. Apparently, though, negotiations among
developed countries have not generated a signiﬁcant impact on the trade volumes of developing
country members of GATT/WTO.
Why hasn’t GATT/WTO membership generated the anticipated trade-volume impact for de-
veloping countries? One possible explanation is that developed countries have found ways around
the MFN principle, so that their tariﬀ bargaining in fact discriminates against non-participating
GATT/WTO members. Bown’s (2004) ﬁndings, however, weigh against this explanation. He ﬁnds
that countries do indeed abide by the MFN principle, at least in the context of GATT/WTO bi-
lateral dispute settlement negotiations.3 Here, we explore a diﬀerent explanation, namely, that the
non-reciprocal approach anchored in SDT itself lies behind the absence of meaningful trade gains
for developing countries. Since the non-reciprocal approach is also a feature of the current Doha
negotiations, our explanation suggests that these negotiations may also be structured in a way that
will fail to generate appreciable impact on the trade volumes of developing country members of
GATT/WTO.
2.1 The Problem with SDT
Two distinct and potentially complementary arguments linking SDT clauses to the disappointing
developing country experience in the GATT/WTO may be identiﬁed. A ﬁrst argument is straight-
forward: SDT may have given developing countries a free pass to the tariﬀ liberalization negoti-
ated by developed countries, but it took away their voice in determining which developed country
markets were liberalized through GATT/WTO negotiations, with the predictable result that the
developed-country markets that were traditionally the most important to developing countries (e.g.,
textiles and apparel, certain agricultural products, footwear) experienced the least negotiated trade
liberalization under GATT/WTO auspices. Finger (1979) is a strong advocate of this argument,
and notes that a small number of active developing country participants in the Kennedy Round of
GATT negotiations (1964-67) served as “the exception that proves the rule”:
“Unfortunately, the third world and its spokespersons and institutions have taken a
vocal position against a reciprocal role for LDCs. The Kennedy Round, however, pro-
vides strong evidence that reciprocity pays. There, the United States made concessions
(almost entirely tariﬀ reductions) on $571 million or 33 percent of its (1964) imports
3In examining the outcomes of GATT/WTO bilateral dispute settlement negotiations, Bown (2004) also ﬁnds
that a country’s potential for retaliatory tariﬀ threats is an important predictor of whether it will receive non-
discriminatory treatment in the settlement of a bilateral dispute between two of its trading partners. Applied more
broadly, this ﬁnding would suggest that “small” developing countries who lack the capacity for trade retaliation may
be at greater risk of facing discrimination in the GATT/WTO system, and this could then help explain why small
developing countries have not enjoyed trade gains with GATT/WTO membership. But this explanation could not
account for the lack of trade gains from GATT/WTO membership that the larger developing countries have also
experienced (see also note 12).
3from the nine active LDC participants...Of some $6 billion of U.S. imports in 1964 from
other LDCs, only 5 percent was subject to concessions.” Finger (1979, p. 435)
In addition to the evidence cited by Finger, some indirect evidence for the relevance of this ﬁrst
argument in helping to explain the weak trade eﬀects of GATT/WTO membership for developing
countries can be found in the implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),
which was introduced as an SDT provision of GATT under the “Enabling Clause” for developing
countries. Under GSP, it was hoped that developing countries might beneﬁt from unilateral grants
of preferential market access by developed countries. But the unilateral nature of these market
access commitments has in practice limited their impact on developing country trade (see, for
example, Ozden and Reinhardt, 2005). As Grossman and Sykes (2005) describe, this limited
impact has occurred because developed countries have inevitably implemented their GSP programs
in a way that minimizes the potential political costs to themselves (e.g., by exempting from GSP
eligibility politically sensitive sectors such as certain textiles and apparel products, footwear and
certain agricultural products) and/or have introduced reciprocity in other forms (e.g., by oﬀering
tariﬀ preferences in exchange for measures to combat drug traﬃcking). And ﬁnally, in the context
of GATT/WTO MFN tariﬀ commitments, which is our focus here, this ﬁrst argument ﬁnds some
direct empirical support in Subramanian and Wei (2007). We will return to this argument later in
the paper.
But this ﬁrst argument misses the “free pass” logic that was supposed to capture the anticipated
beneﬁts of SDT in the context of MFN tariﬀ bargaining. That logic was never based on the
hope that developed countries would oﬀer unilateral MFN tariﬀ reductions on products where
developing countries were the principal export suppliers to their markets. Instead, as described
above, the logic of SDT was that developing country exporters could “free ride” on the reciprocal
liberalization eﬀorts of others; that is, together with exporters from developed countries, developing
country exporters would enjoy trade beneﬁts from the MFN tariﬀ cuts that the developed countries
negotiated with one another. Central to this logic is the existence of developed and developing
country exporters who compete with each other for sales to developed country markets on products
that fall within a given tariﬀ line, but competing exporters play no role in the argument we have
just described. It is this role that we highlight in a second argument linking the SDT clause to the
disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO.
To develop this second argument, we begin by sketching a simple general equilibrium model of
trade in two goods between three countries. Suppose that the home country imports good  from
foreign countries 1 and 2, and that the two foreign countries import good  from the home country,
with all goods produced in perfectly competitive markets and each country imposing a tariﬀ on its
imports. For simplicity, we assume that the two foreign countries do not trade with one another;
notice, though, that they are competing exporters of good  into the home country market. We
denote the local relative prices in the home and foreign countries as  ≡  and ∗ ≡ ∗
 ∗
 ,
respectively, where we use an asterisk to denote foreign country variables and where  =1 2.T h e














of good . For foreign country , the ad valorem import tariﬀ rate on good  is denoted as ∗.
The pattern of trade and trade policies for each country are depicted schematically in Figure 1.
The world price for trade between the home country and foreign country  is  ≡ ∗
 .N o t i c e
that  is thus foreign country ’s terms of trade. Deﬁning  ≡ 1+ and  ≡ 1+∗ we have
that  =  and ∗ =( 1 ∗). Since the home country applies a non-discriminatory tariﬀ,
we thus see that 1 = 2 ≡ ; that is, the two foreign countries must share the same terms
of trade when the home country adopts an MFN tariﬀ policy. We thus have that  =  and
∗ =( 1 ∗). Finally, we note that the home country’s terms of trade in this MFN setting is
given as 1
In a given country, once the local and world prices are determined, all economic quantities
(production, consumption, tariﬀ revenue, imports, exports) are also determined. In turn, for a
given set of tariﬀs, (∗1∗2), once we determine a market-clearing world price, e (∗1∗2),
then all local prices are determined. This follows since the pricing relationships just presented then
yield the local prices as (e )=e  and ∗(∗ e )=( 1 ∗)e , respectively. Finally, the
market-clearing world price is determined as the world price which ensures that the home-country
imports of good  equals the sum of exports of good  from foreign countries 1 and 2; in other
words, e (∗1∗2) is the value for  which solves
(() )=∗1(∗1(∗1 ) )+∗2(∗2(∗2 ) ) (1)
As is standard, for each country, we assume as well that import and export functions are deﬁned
in a manner that satisﬁes trade balance requirements:
()=() (2)
∗(∗ )=∗(∗ ) for  =1 2
where () denotes home-country exports of good  and ∗(∗ ) represents foreign-country-
 imports of good . The market clearing requirement for good  is then implied by (1) and (2).
5We assume that each of these three countries is “large,” in the traditional sense that a change in
the country’s tariﬀ results in a change in the market-clearing world price. We emphasize, though,
that for some countries the resulting world-price change may be small in size; that is, some countries
may be much less large than are others. We assume that prices depend on tariﬀs in the “standard”





∗ =1 2 (3)
Likewise, when a country raises its import tariﬀ, the local price of the import good relative to the






Intuitively, if a country raises its import tariﬀ, then some of the incidence is borne by foreign
exporters, who receive a lower export price for their product, and some of the incidence is passed
on to domestic consumers, who pay a high local price for the imported good. We will discuss below
speciﬁc evidence relating to the ability of importing countries to impose the incidence of tariﬀso n
foreign exporters, but here we note that there is strong evidence that the incidence of trade costs
more generally are borne disproportionately by exporters. For example, according to a recent paper
by Anderson and Yotov (2010), sellers/exporters bear a signiﬁcant portion of trade costs relative
to buyers/importers, with exporters’ incidence in the early 1990’s roughly 5 times larger than that
borne by importers according to Anderson and Yotov’s estimates.
Having sketched the general equilibrium model of trade, let us now return to the discussion above
and consider the possibility that the home country and foreign country 1 negotiate a reciprocal
reduction in import tariﬀs while foreign country 2 takes a “free pass” and leaves its tariﬀ unaltered.
What can we say about the implications of this negotiation for foreign country 2’s volume of trade?
To address this question, we place two restrictions on the negotiation between the home country
and foreign country 1 First, the home country tariﬀ satisﬁes the MFN requirement. This restriction
is already imposed in the description of the model. Second, the negotiation satisﬁes the principle of
reciprocity for the home country and foreign country 1. In broad terms, this means that the resulting
changes in tariﬀs bring about changes in the volume of each negotiating country’s imports that are
of equal value to changes in the volume of its exports. Formally, we suppose that the home country
and foreign country 1 undertake a negotiation in which they change their tariﬀs from some initial
tariﬀ pair, (,∗1
 ), to a new tariﬀ pair, (,∗1
 ). The tariﬀ of foreign country 2 is ﬁxed throughout
at its initial level, ∗2
  We denote the initial and new world prices as e 




 ≡ e (∗1
 ∗2
 ) and similarly we represent the initial and new local prices in foreign country
1 as ∗1
 ≡ ∗1(∗1
  e 
) and ∗1
 ≡ ∗1(∗1
  e 
).F o rf o r e i g nc o u n t r y1, the principle of reciprocity









  e 
), ∗1
 ≡ ∗1(∗1
  e 
) ∗1
 ≡ ∗1(∗1
  e 
) and ∗1
 ≡ ∗1(∗1
  e 
).4
Under GATT/WTO rules, trade liberalization negotiations are not required to satisfy the prin-
ciple of reciprocity. It is frequently observed, however, that countries seek to obtain a “balance
of concessions” in their negotiations. We may thus understand the principle of reciprocity as a
negotiation norm. While more evidence is needed before the empirical issue is settled, we note
that some recent studies (Shirono, 2004; Limao, 2006, 2007; Karacaovali and Limao, 2008) provide
empirical support for the view that actual tariﬀ bargaining outcomes in the GATT/WTO conform
to a reciprocity norm.
Following Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2005), we now use the balanced trade condition (2) for
foreign country 1, which must hold both at the initial tariﬀs and the new tariﬀs, to rewrite the
reciprocity condition (5) as
[e 
 − e 
]∗1
 =0  (6)
Using (6), we thus see that mutual changes in trade policy for the home country and foreign country
1 satisfy the principle of reciprocity if and only if they leave the world price unchanged. When
countries reduce tariﬀs in a manner that satisﬁes the principle of reciprocity, therefore, they achieve
higher trade volumes even though their terms of trade are unaltered.5 The higher trade volumes
arise entirely as a consequence of the induced changes in local prices in each negotiating country.
We are now in position to consider the implications of this negotiation for foreign country 2’s
volume of trade. The main ﬁnding is that foreign country 2 experiences no change in its trade
volume, when the home country and foreign country 1 exchange tariﬀ reductions that satisfy the
principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. To establish this ﬁnding, we observe ﬁrst that
foreign country 2’s terms of trade, e  are unaltered. The principle of non-discrimination ensures
that foreign country 2 enjoys the same terms of trade as does foreign country 1, and as argued
just above the principle of reciprocity in turn ensures that foreign country 1’s terms of trade are
unaltered by the negotiated reduction in tariﬀs. A second observation is that foreign country 2’s
local price, ∗2(∗2 e ), is also unaltered. This follows since foreign country 2’s terms of trade are
unaltered and foreign country 2 does not undertake a tariﬀ change of its own. With its world and
local prices unchanged, foreign country 2 thus experiences no change in its production, consumption,
tariﬀ revenue, imports or exports.
This ﬁnding is perhaps surprising, since as Figure 1 reﬂects and as we have emphasized, foreign
country 2 receives a (non-discriminatory) tariﬀ cut from the home country. How can a country
experience no change in its trade volume, when the import tariﬀ of its trading partner is reduced
4As we explain below in footnote 7, if the described change in tariﬀs satisﬁes the principle of reciprocity from the
perspective of foreign country 1, then the tariﬀ change also satisﬁes the principle of reciprocity from the perspective
of the home country.
5If the home country were to violate MFN and adopt discriminatory tariﬀs, then its bilateral terms of trade with
foreign country 1 would diﬀer from its bilateral terms of trade with foreign country 2. The home country’s multilateral
terms of trade might then change even when a negotiated tariﬀ change with foreign country 1 preserves its bilateral
terms of trade with foreign country 1. We assume here, though, that the home country adopts non-discriminatory
tariﬀs, and so the home country’s bilateral and multilateral terms of trade are all represented by a common expression,
1 
. See Bagwell and Staiger (1999, 2005) for further discussion.
7and it oﬀers no tariﬀ cut of its own? The key point is that the negotiation between the home
country and foreign country 1 alters the local price in foreign country 1. Following the reciprocal
tariﬀ reduction, the local price of the import good relative to the export good in foreign country
1 must fall (i.e., ∗1 must rise). As a consequence, consumers in foreign country 1 substitute
consumption toward the import good and away from the export good, and resources for production
shift from the import good toward the export good. For both of these reasons, when foreign
country 1 cuts its import tariﬀ, its export volume (production minus consumption of the export
good) rises.6 The principle of reciprocity then has the eﬀect of ensuring that the expansion in
export volume from foreign country 1 exactly satisﬁes the increased demand for imports coming
from the home country. In other words, foreign country 2’s hope of a “free pass” to greater export
volume is thwarted by the fact that, while the home country now oﬀers a more open market on
a non-discriminatory basis to all comers, foreign country 2 must compete for sales in that market
with a more “high-export-performing” foreign country 1.7
More generally, this ﬁnding suggests a simple maxim for trade negotiations: what you get is
what you give. A country that reciprocates and cuts its own import tariﬀs in exchange for MFN
tariﬀ cuts in markets served by its exporters will see its exporters gain more export volume from the
additional access in those markets than will exporters from countries that did not reciprocate (i.e.,
that did not agree to tariﬀ cuts of their own). Indeed, in the simple three-country model presented
above, if one foreign country liberalizes in a manner that satisﬁes the principle of reciprocity, while
another foreign country does not liberalize on its own, then the latter country sees no change in its
trade volume whatsoever.
Notice, too, that this maxim does not amount to a simple expression of the gains from unilateral
trade liberalization, because it is stated in the context of negotiated reciprocal trade liberalization
where, critically, the terms-of-trade impacts of one’s own liberalization are oﬀset by the impacts of
the reciprocal liberalization of a trading partner. Hence, it is when countries come together to nego-
tiate reciprocal MFN trade liberalization, as in a GATT/WTO round of multilateral negotiations,
that the maxim applies.8
At a general level the practical signiﬁcance of the ﬁnding we report above is supported by
a wide body of empirical studies that conﬁrm the key mechanism: a country’s own tariﬀ cuts
stimulate its exports. We mention here four recent studies that are of special relevance. Edwards
6This is simply an instance of the Lerner symmetry theorem, which ensures in this two-good setting that a
reduction in a country’s import tariﬀ has the same eﬀect as would an increase in its export subsidy.
7Given that trade volume from foreign country 2 is unaltered, it is now apparent that, if the principle of reciprocity
is satisﬁed from the perspective of foreign country 1,t h e ni ti sa l s os a t i s ﬁed from the perspective of the home country.
8We claim that this maxim applies to developed and developing countries alike. And yet our formal model
adopts a number of assumptions that may seem ill-suited when applied to particular developing countries (e.g.,
perfectly competitive and smoothly functioning production sectors). It is therefore important to point out that these
assumptions are not central to our main message. For example, even in an “endowment economy” where production
is completely rigid and unresponsive to prices, a country’s import barriers would continue to impede its exports,
through responses on the demand side of the economy. Hence, the impacts of tariﬀ cuts on own exports that we have
emphasized do not depend on the existence of well-functioning markets in a country that can reallocate productive
resources smoothly and eﬃciently across uses. This is also borne out in the data, and indeed much of the relevant
empirical evidence that we discuss next concerns developing countries.
8and Lawrence (2006) examine the relationship between South Africa’s export performance and
its import tariﬀs and conclude: “In the long run a 1% rise in tariﬀs raises domestic prices by
0.48%. This in turn reduces the proﬁtability (both relative and absolutely) of export supply and
hence lowers export volumes by 0.31%....” Mukerji (2009) examines the impact of India’s tariﬀ
liberalization on its export performance, and ﬁnds that India both increased its export volume
of traditional export goods (intensive margin eﬀects) and began exporting signiﬁcant numbers of
new goods (extensive margin eﬀects) as a result of its tariﬀ cuts. In another study, Mostashari
(2010) focuses on explaining the changing distribution of export shares among countries exporting
to the United States and ﬁnds that, especially for less developed countries, their own liberalizations
have been quantitatively much more important in explaining changes in bilateral trade shares to
the United States than the impact of US liberalizations. Finally, Tokarick (2007, p. 207) reports
evidence that “developing countries could expand their exports by a much larger percentage by
eliminating their own tariﬀ barriers, rather than waiting for tariﬀ reductions from rich countries.”9
And in policy circles, the fact that a country’s import tariﬀs act to impede its exports has been
recognized for decades. For example, in describing the forces that led to the demise of the import
substitution policies popular in the developing countries of Latin America in the 1950s and 60s,
Dornbusch (1992) writes:
In the late 1960s and 1970s, protection in developing countries softened in at least
one direction. Many countries recognized that protection by tariﬀs and quotas did keep
imports out, but that the resulting decline in demand for foreign exchange also led to
an appreciation of the currency and hence a severe tax on exports of both traditional
commodities and emerging industrial goods. Unstable real exchange rates added to
the hazards of export activities. Moreover, duties on imported intermediate goods ﬁrst
implied a tax on export activities using these goods, and then helped cause a currency
overvaluation which hurt export competitiveness of these products. (pp. 71-72)
The novelty in our argument above is simply to develop the implications of the import-tariﬀs-
impede-exports observation in a competing exporter setting of reciprocal MFN tariﬀ bargaining.10
9There is also related evidence on the link between own tariﬀs and industry-level productivity. For example, Treﬂer
(2004) examines the impact of Canadian tariﬀ concessions in the Canadian-US free trade agreement and reports that
Canada’s own tariﬀ cuts raised labor productivity in Canada by 15 percent in the most impacted, import-competing
group of industries, thereby quantifying a large and positive industry-level productivity eﬀect associated with own-
tariﬀ cuts.
10The observation that a country’s import barriers act to impede its exports should be distinguished from the
question of whether a country’s import barriers impede its growth. This openness-growth linkage is at the center of
the debate over the validity of the so-called “Washington Consensus” and has come under intense criticism over the
past decade (for a recent contribution to this debate, see Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2008). By contrast, the basic link
between a country’s import barriers and its exports which we highlight in our discussion above is widely accepted,
and is not part of the debate over the Washington Consensus.
92.2 SDT and the Doha Round
What are the implications of this discussion for the Doha Round? Here we emphasize two. The
ﬁrst implication is that Doha’s largely non-reciprocal approach, still anchored in a long GATT
tradition of SDT, is unlikely to deliver meaningful trade gains for developing countries, just as
this approach did not do so over the previous half century. Rather, substantial trade-volume gains
for developing countries from negotiated trade liberalization can be achieved most eﬀectively if
developing countries prepare, in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table
and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed nations.11 This implication seems
to run counter to much current thinking on the Doha Round. For example, the recently released
Bhagwati-Sutherland Report (2011) states:
“...The expectation that in most cases developing countries should be entitled to
ﬂexibilities in the application of tariﬀ cuts that are not available to developed WTO
states has also followed from the widening of the membership and the development of
a body of thinking about the pace and depth of liberalization that is appropriate for
developing countries. This assumption — that a development friendly trade deal must
demand less of countries in a way that is proportionate to their state of development
— permeates the Doha Round and the ﬁnal package will rightly have to be measured
against it.
“This means that developed countries have to accept that the outcome will be asym-
metrical, even vis-a-vis large and competitive exporters like China and Brazil who re-
main in development.” (p. 6).
Our discussion above is at odds with this position, and suggests that, rather than accepting and
embracing the non-reciprocal approach embodied in SDT as an appropriate standard for the Doha
Round, the success of the Doha Round as a Development Round may hinge on rejecting SDT as
the cornerstone of the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO.12
11In this regard, a limited opportunity to gauge the potential trade impacts for a developing country when it cuts
its tariﬀs in a reciprocal fashion in a WTO negotiation is provided by accession negotiations that occurred during
and after the Uruguay Round, because strict adherence to SDT was not followed in accession negotiations over this
period, and instead existing developed country members asked for more-or-less reciprocal commitments from new
member countries as a condition for membership. Subramanian and Wei (2007) exploit this diﬀerence in membership
requirements across old (pre-Uruguay Round) and new (post-Uruguay Round) developing country GATT/WTO
members, and ﬁnd that developing countries who were asked to make more nearly reciprocal tariﬀ cuts of their own
in exchange for WTO membership did indeed enjoy greater trade eﬀects of membership than developing countries
who were allowed to not reciprocate under SDT. We also note that the ﬁrst implication we emphasize above shares
much with Finger’s (1979, pp. 437-8) suggestion regarding a possible method for better integrating less-developed
countries (LDCs) into the GATT: “An approach to consider is a return to the format of the old reciprocal trade
negotiations, concentrating, however, on exchanges between a major industrial country and its major LDC trading
partners. The feasibility of such an approach depends on there being substantial bilateral, principal supplier trade
ﬂows between the proposed participants that are subject to negotiable trade restrictions.”
12As will become clear below, to the extent that a developing country is truly “small” in its relevant markets, it
should not be expected to oﬀer tariﬀ concessions in a trade agreement according to the terms-of-trade theory; but this
observation holds equally for developed countries, and therefore provides no rationale for an SDT-type norm applied
to developing countries (see Staiger, 2006, for an elaboration on some of these themes as they relate to developing
10The second, and more speculative, implication concerns the manner in which negotiations must
proceed if developing countries are to beneﬁt (i.e., advance their own objectives). To develop this
implication, we must dig somewhat deeper and consider the purpose of a trade agreement.
According to the terms-of-trade theory, the purpose of trade agreements is to facilitate an escape
from a terms-of-trade driven Prisoners’ Dilemma. In the absence of a trade agreement, governments
would set optimal unilateral trade policies. For t h eg o v e r n m e n to fal a r g ec o u n t r y ,ah i g h e ri m p o r t
tariﬀ raises the local relative price of the import good and also lowers the relative price of the
import good on the world market. This latter eﬀect means that a higher import tariﬀ improves
the importing country’s terms of trade and results in a deterioration of the terms of trade for the
exporting country. A higher import tariﬀ from a large country thus imposes a negative terms-of-
trade externality on its trading partner, whose exporters receive a lower world price. Governments
fail to internalize this externality in the absence of a trade agreement, and as a consequence tariﬀs
are higher than would be eﬃcient, where eﬃciency is measured relative to government preferences.
Starting from this ineﬃcient outcome, governments can then gain from a trade agreement in which
they reciprocally lower tariﬀs. The gains come from eliminating the local-price distortions that
arise under unilateral tariﬀ setting when foreign exporters pay part of the cost of domestic import
protection.
A growing body of evidence provides support for the key features of this theory.13 We men-
tion here four sets of ﬁndings. First, Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) provide evidence that
even seemingly “small” countries (and many developing countries) are large in some markets and
that unilateral tariﬀ setting responds to cost-shifting incentives where countries are large. Sec-
ond, Broda, Limao and Weinstein (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2011) ﬁnd that the pattern
of GATT/WTO negotiated tariﬀ cuts is consistent with the elimination of the cost-shifting com-
ponent of unilateral tariﬀs. Third, empirical work by Ludema and Mayda (2010) indicates that
GATT/WTO tariﬀ bindings exhibit remnants of a cost-shifting component where one would expect
to ﬁnd such remnants, given MFN and the pattern of non-reciprocity. And ﬁnally, Eicher and Henn
(2011) ﬁnd that the trade eﬀects associated with WTO membership are largest for countries that
were large in world markets at the time of their accession to the GATT/WTO (and hence would
be expected to have a signiﬁcant cost-shifting component in their unilateral tariﬀs and therefore to
negotiate large tariﬀ reductions in the GATT/WTO according to the terms-of-trade theory).
The terms-of-trade theory of trade agreements thus suggests that developing countries stand
to gain from reciprocal trade liberalization wherever they are big enough that foreign exporters
countries and the WTO). In essence, according to the terms-of-trade theory, it is the biggest countries — whether
developed or developing — who adopt unilateral trade policies that are the most internationally ineﬃcient, and hence
it is the biggest countries that should negotiate the most substantial tariﬀ bindings under an internationally eﬃcient
trade agreement. Also, our discussion of SDT has been couched in terms of an escape from the reciprocity norm
in the context of tariﬀ bindings and market access negotiations, but as we have noted there are a number of SDT
clauses throughout the GATT/WTO. For example, a major sticking point in the Doha Round that contributed to
the breakdown of negotiations in 2008 was the special agricultural safeguard mechanism for developing countries, a
provision which reﬂects the SDT clause. The implications we discuss here would be relevant for these other instances
of non-reciprocal SDT clauses as well.
13See Bagwell and Staiger (2010) for a recent survey.
11“feel the pain” of their tariﬀs (i.e., care about access to their markets). When this is true, foreign
countries are motivated to engage with the developing country and identify mutually beneﬁcial and
reciprocal tariﬀ reductions. Returning to our earlier discussion of the two arguments linking SDT
clauses to the disappointing developing country experience in the GATT/WTO, we now observe
that these two arguments have starkly diﬀerent implications for the manner in which negotiations
should proceed in the Doha Round.
Consider ﬁrst the argument that, where developing countries have traditionally been the princi-
pal export suppliers into developed country markets (e.g., textiles and apparel, certain agricultural
products, footwear), SDT has simply resulted in a lack of GATT/WTO sponsored liberalization
in developed country markets because it has prevented the liberalizing forces of reciprocity from
taking hold. Here the implications of our discussion for the Doha Round are simple: reject SDT,
and let reciprocal bargaining between developed and developing countries do for developed-country
market access in these sectors what has already been achieved for manufactured goods more gen-
erally through reciprocal bargaining between developed countries. In this case, each government
involved in the reciprocal negotiations stands to gain in the standard way, i.e., from the elimination
of local-price distortions that arise under unilateral tariﬀ setting when foreign exporters pay part
of the cost of domestic import protection.14
Next consider the second argument linking SDT clauses to the disappointing developing country
experience in the GATT/WTO that we discussed above, which applies to the competing exporter
case. Here there is an important diﬀerence: it is now relevant that reciprocal bargaining between
developed countries has gone on for over 50 years; and as a result, developed country tariﬀso nm o s t
manufactured goods (which account for almost 90% of world merchandise exports) are already very
low. Developing countries would therefore be “latecomers” to the tariﬀ bargaining arena for these
products, and a potential concern is then that developed countries may have already eliminated
local-price distortions in these markets through previous tariﬀ negotiations. In other words, given
the existing tariﬀs of developed countries, it may be diﬃcult to identify a substantial set of mutually
beneﬁcial and reciprocal tariﬀ bargains with developing countries. This concern is more speculative
in nature, but it points to a potential second implication of our discussion: in order to “make room
at the table” for developing countries, developed countries may need to ﬁnd a way to in eﬀect
renegotiate their existing tariﬀ commitments with one another.
14Even in this simplest case, an interesting complication for the Doha Round arises from the fact that the Uruguay
Round agreement that led to the elimination of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement and hence liberalized market access for
textiles and apparel in developed country markets has been interpreted as a reciprocal agreement between developed
and developing countries, but the form of the reciprocal commitments made by developing countries was not a market
access commitment and instead amounted to accepting commitments associated with the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS
commitments are not market access commitments, and arguably they do not have the same own-export-enhancing
eﬀe c t sa sd ot a r i ﬀ commitments, and in any case would not reduce local-price distortions in developing countries in the
way that traditional market access commitments would. This in turn suggests that the WTO liberalization of textiles
and apparel to date may have (i) eliminated much of the local-price distortions for this sector in developed countries,
while (ii) not achieving much in the way of eliminating local-price distortions in developing country markets, with
the resulting asymmetry between developed and developing countries then exacerbating the “latecomer” problems
that we describe next.
12In particular, for manufactured goods, developed countries may have already achieved the degree
of “openness” that they desire. If this is true, then two issues potentially follow. First, developed
countries at this point may have preserved an inadequate amount of bargaining power; speciﬁcally,
d e v e l o p e dc o u n t r i e sm a yh a v el i t t l el e f tt oo ﬀer developing countries in reciprocal bargains. This
issue naturally complicates any process under which developing countries are to gain through a
reciprocal exchange of tariﬀ reductions with developed countries. A second issue is that a kind of
“globalization fatigue” may be present in the developed world. That is, the existing MFN tariﬀso f
developed countries may be broadly eﬃcient for these countries in the world trading system as it
currently stands, but may be too low for a world in which developing countries are fully integrated
into the world trading system. To the extent that these issues arise, one potential solution would be
to allow for some degree of renegotiation (upward) of existing tariﬀ commitments among developed
countries, in order to “make room” for negotiations (downward) with developing countries.15 The
idea would be to ﬁnd a way to facilitate agreement on the set of negotiated tariﬀ commitments
that the current WTO membership would choose to negotiate today if they were not constrained
in their negotiations by their pre-existing tariﬀ bindings.
The possibility that developed countries might need to renegotiate their existing tariﬀ commit-
ments in order to be able to accommodate the entry of developing countries into the world trading
system sounds admittedly extreme and raises a host of issues from which our simple theoretical
treatment abstracts.16 We thus raise this possibility here primarily as a pedagogical device, and
we will later suggest that other less extreme sounding possibilities may have much the same eﬀect.
Still, it is important to note that the underlying issues described above are far from new or un-
familiar to trade negotiators. Rather, a struggle with the basic problem of how to accommodate
“latecomers” has been in evidence from very early in the GATT/WTO history. For example, in
his assessment of the reasons for the somewhat disappointing outcome of the 1950-51 Torquay
Round, the third negotiating round sponsored under GATT auspices, Executive Secretary of the
Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization E. Wyndham White highlighted the
bargaining power issue as follows:
“Another inhibiting factor was the problem presented by the disparities in the levels
of tariﬀs. A number of European countries with a comparatively low level of tariﬀ rates
considered that they had entered the Torquay negotiations at a disadvantage. Having
bound many of their rates of duty in 1947 and 1949, what could these low-tariﬀ countries
oﬀer at Torquay in order to obtain further concessions from the countries with higher
levels of tariﬀs? The rules adopted by the Contracting Parties for their negotiations
15The ﬁnding that we report above suggests that if the developed countries were to renegotiate (upward) their
existing tariﬀ commitments in a manner that satisﬁes the principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity, then in
principle the trade-volume eﬀects of this renegotiation for other countries could be quite small.
16An obvious worry is that signiﬁcant renegotiations could trigger an unraveling of previous gains. For example,
in the context of a possible slowdown or reversal of the process of negotiated tariﬀ liberalization, some observers
have noted that the GATT/WTO process seems to accord with the “bicycle theory” of trade agreements: unless you
keep peddling, you will fall oﬀ (see Bhagwati, 1988, p. 41, for an early informal statement of the bicycle theory, and
Staiger, 1995, and Devereux, 1997 for early attempts to formally model this idea).
13stipulate that the binding of a low duty or of duty-free treatment is to be recognized
as a concession equivalent in value to the substantial reduction of high tariﬀso rt h e
elimination of tariﬀ preferences. Some thought that, in observance of this rule, the
high-tariﬀ countries should make further reductions in their duties in exchange for the
prolongation of the binding of low duties. But although the high-tariﬀ countries were
sometimes willing to oﬀer concessions without expecting comparable reductions from
countries with low tariﬀs, they were not prepared to grant what they considered to
be unilateral and unrequited concessions. No general solution was found at Torquay,
but the question will be further explored in the near future. Meanwhile, the area of
negotiations between some of the European countries was restricted by this divergence
of view.” (ICITO, 1952, pp. 9-10).
And on a smaller scale, there is also evidence that the second issue of “globalization fatigue” was
already very real at Torquay as well. As E. Wyndham White wrote at the time:
“The Torquay negotiations took place under conditions of much greater stress than
those which prevailed at the time of the Geneva or Annecy Conferences. Besides,
those earlier negotiations had covered much of the ground, and many of the countries
participating at Torquay felt that they had largely exhausted their bargaining power
or that they had gone as far as was justiﬁed in the process of tariﬀ reduction in view
of present-day uncertainties. They felt they needed more time to digest and to assess
the eﬀects of the concessions already made before making further cuts in their tariﬀs.”
(ICITO, 1952, p. 9).
Hence, the issues associated with accommodating latecomers at the bargaining table have posed
long-standing challenges for the GATT/WTO.17
Finally, we note that The Economist also takes the view that the latecomers issue is the central
sticking point at Doha:
“...the real bone of contention is the aim of proposed cuts in tariﬀs on manufactured
goods. America sees the Doha talks as its ﬁnal opportunity to get fast-growing emerging
economies like China and India to slash their duties on imports of such goods, which have
been reduced in previous rounds but remain much higher than those in the rich world.
It wants something approaching parity, at least in some sectors, because it reckons its
own low tariﬀs leave it with few concessions to oﬀer in future talks. But emerging
markets insist that the Doha round was never intended to result in such harmonization.
These positions are fundamentally at odds.” (April 28, 2011)
17There is also the related but distinct question whether credit should be given in multilateral trade negotiations
to developing countries for the autonomous trade policy liberalization they have undertaken (for example as part of
International Monetary Fund or World Bank programs). On this question see Mattoo and Olarreaga, 2001.
14In fact, in light of the expressed intention of the Doha Round to meaningfully integrate its developing
country membership into the world trading system, it may be that, as The Economist seems to
suggest, it is the latecomers problem, rather than the sheer number of countries involved in the
Doha Round, that explains the reason for the current impasse.18
In their interim report on the Doha Round, Bhagwati and Sutherland (2011) propose a short-
term deadline for the round. In this context, we note that the ﬁrst implication of our analysis -
that developing countries must come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and
negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed countries - could be implemented over a
short time span. Our second and more speculative implication, however, that developed countries
may need in eﬀect to renegotiate their existing tariﬀ commitments, raises a host of issues beyond
our simple model and would appear challenging to implement over a short time span. It is possible,
however, to interpret ongoing eﬀorts in the Doha negotiations as in eﬀect helping to achieve ends
consistent with our second implication, and after considering in the next section the nature of the
agriculture negotiations we return to this possibility in section 4.
3A g r i c u l t u r e
Another key objective of the current (Doha) round of GATT/WTO multilateral trade negotiations
is to extend GATT/WTO disciplines to the agriculture sector. The central role of this objective
is revealed by the prominent eﬀorts to reduce agricultural subsidies and by the high-proﬁle Doha
negotiation failures that have resulted. In the Doha Round so far, the approach has been to en-
courage negotiations that deliver reductions in trade-distorting agricultural subsidies in exchange
for reductions in import tariﬀs. This approach is strikingly diﬀerent from traditional GATT/WTO
bargaining, in which countries exchange market-access commitments through agreements to recip-
rocally lower import tariﬀs. Traditional market-access bargaining has been successful, and the
beneﬁts of such a negotiation approach can be readily understood using the terms-of-trade theory
of trade agreements. The negotiation approach taken in the Doha Round, by contrast, has fared
rather poorly so far, and we argue in this section that one explanation may be that the underlying
economics of this approach are less sound. We thus suggest that the liberalization of agriculture
should reorient toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining.
Blustein (2009) provides an interesting historical account of negotiations over agriculture policies
in the Doha Round. He describes the terms of the agriculture bargain that emerged from Doha in
2005 as follows:
18This stance ﬁnds further support in Neary’s (2004) observation that the eight GATT rounds beginning in 1947
and ending with the creation of the WTO in 1995 exhibited a tight empirical relationship between the duration of
the round and the number of countries participating. Based on this empirical relationship, Neary predicted (with
a grain of salt) that the Doha Round would be completed in May 2010. Given that anything approaching a true
“development” round that would meaningfully integrate the developing country members into the world trading
system appears to be years oﬀ in the future, it seems safe to say that this empirical relationship has broken down
with the Doha Round, and one explanation for the breakdown is the diﬃculty dealing with the latecomers problem
on a scale that has never before been confronted in the history of the GATT/WTO.
15“The package was based on a hardheaded political calculation, in the ﬁnest tradition
of WTO- and GATT-style mercantilism. Curbing farm subsidies might be a desirable
policy for the United States as a whole, but it was a ‘sacriﬁce’ that American politicians
could accept only if most farm groups were assured that their export opportunities would
burgeon. A Kansas wheat grower who might ordinarily rebel at seeing his federal check
shrink would presumably acquiesce provided his crops stood a better chance of gaining
access to European consumers or the booming emerging markets of India and China.”
(pp. 205-6).
But with the suspension of the round in 2008, Blustein observes:
“Agriculture groups felt that the deal on the table simply wouldn’t provide enough
new market access for U.S. farm exports to compensate for the reduction in the cap
on U.S. subsidies...the handwriting seemed to be on the wall: Although U.S. exporters
would gain additional sales in high-income markets, such as the European Union, for
beef, pork, and some other products, they wouldn’t gain much, if anything, in the
world’s emerging markets, because the loopholes granted to developing countries were
too large.” (p. 269)
As Blustein describes, from the perspective of the United States the essential agriculture bargain
that emerged from Doha amounts to cuts in subsidies for US farmers in exchange for greater market
access abroad for the exports of US farmers. In light of this experience, it is natural to ask: Why
hasn’t Doha’s approach to agriculture liberalization succeeded?
To address this question, we begin by emphasizing that, contrary to Blustein’s assertion, ex-
changing cuts in the export-sector subsidies of one country for cuts in the import tariﬀs of another
country departs from the “tradition of WTO- and GATT-style mercantilism” in a number of cru-
cial respects. For one thing, the traditional political tradeoﬀ between export interests and import-
competing interests that has characterized all previous rounds is absent. Instead, the negotiated
changes produce costs (reduced subsidies) and beneﬁts (lower foreign import tariﬀs) for domestic
export interests, with a net eﬀect that may be small or even negative. As a result, there may be no
domestic group ready to push for the round. Anecdotal evidence of this possibility is also reported
by Blustein:
“It was really sobering to hear the ag and NAM [National Association of Manu-
facturers] people say, ‘Hmmm, this isn’t worth the trouble,’ recalls one congressional
staﬀer who attended the meetings. “How would you get that passed in Congress?” (p.
270)
By contrast, traditional market-access bargaining exchanges domestic tariﬀ cuts for foreign tariﬀ
cuts, ensuring that at least one domestic group in each country (namely, domestic exporters) is






A second and more fundamental diﬀerence between traditional market-access bargaining and
the Doha approach to agriculture as described by Blustein (2009) concerns the extent to which
the negotiation may be expected to generate eﬃciency gains and thus a potential for a mutually
beneﬁcial agreement. As described in the preceding section, under traditional market-access bar-
gaining in which reciprocal tariﬀ cuts are exchanged, governments can enjoy mutual gains as they
eliminate local-price distortions without suﬀering terms-of-trade losses. Consider now the Doha
approach, under which one country reduces its export-sector subsidy in exchange for a reduction in
the import tariﬀ of its trading partner. The basic problem is most easily understood with reference
to a pure export subsidy (i.e., a subsidy that is paid contingent on export), and when the exchange
is balanced, so that the export subsidy and import tariﬀ are reduced at the same rate. In this
case, the net tariﬀ (i.e., the import tariﬀ less the export subsidy) faced by exporters is unaltered;
as a consequence, the price received by exporters is unchanged, and so trade volume is unaﬀected.
In fact, the sole consequence of a balanced exchange of this kind is a monetary transfer from the
importing country (whose tariﬀ revenue declines) to the exporting country (whose subsidy expenses
decline). Clearly, a balanced exchange of this kind cannot lead to mutual gains for the negotiating
countries, and from this perspective it is not surprising that an agreement has been diﬃcult to
achieve using the Doha approach.19
The described case of a balanced exchange is somewhat special, and so it is important to
emphasize that our concerns with the Doha approach are not limited to this case. Consider, for
example, Figure 2, which illustrates schematically a two-country partial-equilibrium setting where
19To make our points in the starkest possible way, we focus here and throughout this section on export subsidies as
a particular case of the export-sector subsidies that feature prominently in Blustein’s (2009) description of the Doha
agriculture negotiations. More generally, these subsidies also include domestic production subsidies oﬀered in export
sectors (i.e., subsidies that are paid to each unit of domestic production regardless of where it is sold), and indeed in
the Doha agricultural negotiations these so-called “domestic supports” for US farmers have proven to be the most
contentious. Our analysis can be extended to include domestic supports, and while the analysis then becomes more
complex because the domestic production subsidy and the foreign import tariﬀ imply diﬀerent price distortions (and








one country exports a good to another country. To ﬁx ideas, suppose further that each government
seeks to maximize the real income of its country and that markets are perfectly competitive. The
eﬃcient trade volume is then the volume that is achieved when both countries adopt free-trade
policies. The eﬃcient trade volume is also achieved, however, when the speciﬁc (i.e., per-unit)
export subsidy oﬀered by the exporting country ()e q u a l st h es p e c i ﬁci m p o r tt a r i ﬀ imposed by
the importing country (∗), so that the net tariﬀ (∗ − ) is zero. Starting from such a point,
global welfare would drop if export subsidies were banned and import tariﬀs remained positive.20
Likewise, if the initial net tariﬀ were positive, then trade volume would be ineﬃciently low. In this
case, a reduction in the level of export subsidization would itself lower trade volume further and
could only enhance eﬃciency if it were exchanged for an even greater reduction in the import tariﬀ.
There is certainly no guarantee, though, that the importing country would ﬁnd such an exchange
beneﬁcial.
For these reasons, we conclude that the agricultural package on the table in the Doha Round
is not in the tradition of GATT-WTO market-access bargains. And the main implication of our
discussion is even more pointed: the Doha approach of negotiating reductions in export-sector
agricultural subsidies in exchange for reductions in agricultural import tariﬀs may in fact be un-
workable, because it is unlikely to lead to an agreement in which all parties to the agreement gain.
This is not to say that cuts in subsidies couldn’t be part of a broader bargain in which traditional
market access bargaining over tariﬀs also took place. For example, in a setting where each country
has a good that it exports to the other, consider a bargain in which the home country agrees to
reduce its import tariﬀ  and its export subsidy  in exchange for a commitment from the foreign
country to reduce its import tariﬀ ∗, as suggested schematically in Figure 3. Such a bargain could
certainly generate mutual gains for the home and foreign countries, if the agreed reductions in 
20This is a “second-best” argument, which is analogous to the well-known trade-diversion logic that arises when
evaluating free trade areas. Intuitively, if the exporting government removes its export subsidy while the importing
country maintains its import tariﬀ, then trade is diverted from potentially more eﬃcient ﬁrms in the exporting

















and ∗ imply a reduction in the net tariﬀ (∗ −) on the foreign import good; but our point is that
these gains would come in spite of the agreed reduction in , not because of it. In this sense we
s u g g e s tt h a te ﬀorts to liberalize agriculture in the Doha Round are more likely to succeed if they
reorient toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining.21
Our agriculture discussion thus far has abstracted from third-country issues, but such issues
are certainly relevant for the agriculture negotiations in the Doha Round. It is therefore important
to note that the simple insights that we have emphasized above extend to a multi-country setting,
and in some respects are even strengthened.
To illustrate this, we now extend the basic setting depicted in Figure 3 to a three-country partial
equilibrium setting, in which two of the countries utilize export subsidies but the third country does
not. The pattern of trade and trade policies for each country are depicted schematically in Figure 4.
We refer to the two countries that apply export subsidies as the EU and the US, to convey the fact
that it is mainly the developed countries that oﬀer subsidies to their agricultural producers, and we
refer to the third country that possesses no export subsidy policies as Brazil. For the moment we
continue to assume that these three countries trade two goods (plus the usual traded and untaxed
numeraire good in the background of this partial equilibrium setup), with the EU exporting good 
and importing good ,t h eU Se x p o r t i n gg o o d and importing good , and Brazil exporting both
21In this regard, it is interesting to note that Blustein (2009, p. 203) describes a meeting of trade ministers in Geneva
on June 30 2006 in which the U.S. trade representative Susan Schwab voiced a position that seems broadly consistent
with this view. As Blustein writes, “Schwab, who was accompanied by Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns, countered
that any additional concessions they might oﬀer on subsidies would simply be pocketed, so it was the responsibility
of the others in the room to step forward with clear pledges to reduce their import barriers. She stuck to the U.S.
argument that in evaluating whether the round was truly successful or not, the best metric would be the degree of
new openness in world agriculture markets rather than cuts in farm subsidies. ‘Market access is where the beneﬁts of
the round will come from,’ she said, reminding the others of the World Bank studies showing that lowering barriers

























goods  and . It is now easy to see that our earlier discussion in the two-country setting applies
as well to this extended three-country setting, but with one additional complicating eﬀect: owing
to Brazil’s exports of  and  to the EU and the US, respectively, any net tariﬀ reductions that the
EU and US might negotiate in the context of also reducing their export subsidies will now cause
a leakage of some of the joint surplus that their negotiations create to the third country, as Brazil
enjoys rising world/export prices (i.e., its terms of trade improve). This, of course, only makes it
harder for the EU and the US to ﬁnd a way to jointly gain from a broader agreement that also
cuts export-sector subsidies, and as we emphasized above any such gains would come in spite of
the agreed reduction in subsidies, not because of it.22
Finally, we note that the addition of a third country does introduce the possibility that the EU
and the US could in fact gain from an agreement to reduce their export-sector subsidies, in the
sense that their joint gain derives directly from their agreed restriction on subsidies rather than
in spite of this agreed restriction. To see this possibility, we now introduce a third good  into
the three-country partial equilibrium setting just described, and assume that good  is imported
by Brazil and exported by both the EU and the US. We suppose further that Brazil applies an
import tariﬀ on good  while the EU and the US each subsidize the exports of  to Brazil, where
the net tariﬀ along each trade channel is positive. Figure 5 depicts this three-country three-good
setting. Relative to our discussion just above, the novel feature here is that the EU and the US
are now competing exporters (of good ) into Brazil, and absent an agreement on export subsidies
22On the other hand, it is easily checked in this setting that: (i) the EU and the US could gain from a negotiation
over their tariﬀs and export subsidies that cut tariﬀsa n draised export subsidies; (ii) such a negotiation could be
engineered so as to neutralize all third-party eﬀe c t so nB r a z i l ;a n d( i i i )s u c han e g o t i a t i o nc o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t h
world-wide eﬃciency. So it is the constraint to reduce export-enhancing subsidies that is the problem here, as we
emphasize in the text.
20they are locked in an export-subsidy competition for Brazil’s market. The important new element
is that an agreement between the EU and the US to restrict their export subsidies will raise the
world price of good , which by itself marks a terms-of-trade improvement for the EU and the
US and can therefore oﬀer a joint beneﬁt to these two countries. Of course, this joint beneﬁt
comes at the expense of Brazil, who suﬀers the counterpart terms-of-trade deterioration. And it is
easy to show that the beneﬁt that the EU and the US enjoy here marks an ineﬃcient victory of
exporter interests over importer — and world — interests. Hence, while it is possible to see in this
three-country three-good setting how the EU and the US  actually beneﬁtf r o ma na g r e e m e n t
to restrict their export-sector subsidies, if this describes the underlying logic of Doha’s approach
to agriculture then any agriculture agreement that does emerge from Doha would not advance the
wider goals of the WTO membership.23
We are therefore left with a pessimistic view of the Doha approach to agriculture negotiations
when this approach is evaluated on its own merits. Nevertheless, taking a broader perspective
and viewing the attempts to limit subsidies within the wider context of the challenges associated
with integrating the less-developed-country members into the world trading system, it is possible
to interpret the eﬀorts to limit agricultural subsidies in the Doha Round as playing a useful role
in helping to address the issues associated with “latecomers” to the GATT/WTO bargaining table
as we described these issues in section 2. We turn to this interpretation next.
4 Making the Doha Round a Development Round
We have suggested above that the success of the Doha Round as a Development Round may hinge
on moving away from the non-reciprocal SDT norm as the cornerstone of the approach to meeting
developing country needs in the WTO. Rather, if developing countries are to share in the gains from
GATT/WTO market access negotiations, we have argued that they must come to the bargaining
table in markets where they are large and negotiate reciprocally with each other and with developed
countries. We have also suggested that in the context of the Doha Round the WTO may be facing a
critical challenge associated with the problem of “latecomers” to the GATT/WTO bargaining table,
in that developed countries at this point may have preserved an inadequate amount of bargaining
power with which to engage developing countries in reciprocal bargains; and in addition a kind
of “globalization fatigue” may be present in the developed world whereby the existing MFN tariﬀ
levels of developed countries may be too low for a world in which developing countries are fully
integrated into the world trading system. And we have indicated that, in theory, to address this
problem developed countries might need to renegotiate (upward) their existing tariﬀ commitments
in order to “make room at the table” and accommodate the entry of developing countries into
the world trading system. Finally, we have observed that, when evaluated on its own merits, the
Doha approach to agricultural negotiations and its emphasis on the reduction of export-enhancing
23The interpretation of export subsidy agreements that we describe here is formalized and developed more fully
in Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Bagwell and Staiger (2002, Ch. 10). See, also, Bagwell and Staiger (2009) and
Mrazova (2010) for alternative possible interpretations of export subsidy agreements.
21agricultural subsidies in exchange for cuts in import tariﬀs seems suspect on economic grounds.
We now suggest that, when viewed from the wider perspective of the Doha Round’s central goal
of integrating the WTO’s developing country members into the world trading system, the emphasis
on reducing and eliminating agricultural export-sector subsidies might itself be reinterpreted as an
initiative that could help “make room at the table” for developing countries, and can in this way be
interpreted as a coherent part of this broader whole. In particular, a Doha Round that (i) engages
developing countries to come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and negotiate
reciprocally with each other and with developed countries, and, as part of the bargain, (ii) reduces
and/or eliminates the agricultural export-sector subsidies of developed countries, could be viewed
as a way to engineer trade volume gains for developing country members while using the reduc-
tion/elimination of agricultural subsidies both as a bargaining chip to entice developing countries
to agree to lower their tariﬀs, thereby generating bargaining power for the “low-tariﬀ” developed
world, and as a device to mitigate the overall trade eﬀects of integrating developing countries into
the world trading system, thereby addressing the issue of developed-world “globalization fatigue.”
That is, if the developed world is struggling with how to handle the latecomers problem, then the
negotiated reduction in agricultural export-sector subsidies might be seen as a way to address that
problem.
This point can be seen both from the perspective of the general equilibrium model that we
sketched in section 2, and from the partial equilibrium perspectives developed in section 3. From
a general equilibrium perspective, the point derives from the observation that an import tariﬀ acts
like an export tax once its general equilibrium impacts are accounted for, which is why as we have
d e s c r i b e di ns e c t i o n2ac u ti nac o u n t r y ’ so w nt a r i ﬀs, in raising the volume of its imports, will also
stimulate its exports, acting much like the introduction of a program of export subsidies. By the
same token, a cut in a country’s own export subsidies, in reducing the volume of its exports, will
also contract its imports, acting much like an increase in the country’s import tariﬀs. Viewed in this
light, a Doha agreement to reduce/eliminate the agricultural export-sector subsidies of the devel-
oped countries can “make room at the table” and accommodate the entry of developing countries
into the world trading system, because it will have much the same eﬀect as if developed countries
(say, the home country and foreign country 1 in Figure 1) had instead renegotiated (upward) their
existing tariﬀ commitments.24 Hence, the negotiated reduction in agricultural subsidies might be
seen as helping to address the latecomers problem.
To see the same point from a partial equilibrium perspective, it is useful to refer back to Figure
5. There it is clear, for example, that a cut in 
 , the US export subsidy on good , would help
reorient EU imports of good  away from US exporters and toward Brazil exporters, at the same
time that it would (i) reduce overall import volume of good  into the EU, and (ii) raise the price
received by Brazil exporters of good . Similarly, a cut in 
 , the EU export subsidy on good ,
24W h e nac o u n t r y ’ se x p o r t - s e c t o rs u b s i d yt a k e st h ef o r mo fap u r ee x p o r ts u b s i d y ,c u t t i n gi ti si nf a c te q u i v a l e n tt o
an increase in the country’s import tariﬀ. When the export-sector subsidy takes the form of a domestic production
subsidy oﬀered in the export sector, cutting it is equivalent to an increase in the country’s import tariﬀ coupled with
an increase in the country’s consumption tax on the export good.
22would help reorient US imports of good  away from EU exporters and toward Brazil exporters, at
t h es a m et i m et h a ti tw o u l d( i )r e d u c eo v e r a l li m p o r tv o l u m eo fg o o d into the US, and (ii) raise
the price received by Brazil exporters of good . Clearly, these cuts in export subsidies could then
(i) help address “globalization fatigue” in the EU and US by mitigating the overall trade eﬀects
of reciprocal tariﬀ cuts negotiated between the EU and Brazil and between the US and Brazil,
and (ii) if oﬀered as a carrot to Brazil in exchange for tariﬀ cuts from Brazil, could serve as an
extra bargaining chip for use by the “low-tariﬀ”/developed countries EU and US in their reciprocal
tariﬀ bargains with Brazil. Hence, from this partial equilibrium perspective as well, it is clear that
the negotiated reduction in agricultural export subsidies might be seen as helping to address the
latecomers problem.25
Two further points follow from this discussion. First, as is apparent from the partial equilibrium
perspective of Figure 5, the negotiated reduction in agricultural subsidies would be most eﬀective in
addressing the latecomers problem for developing countries that are large exporters of agricultural
products. Hence, negotiated reductions in developed country agricultural subsidies may be an
especially powerful instrument for helping to accommodate Brazil’s integration into the world
trading system, but perhaps less so with regard to China or India.26 And second, it should be
clear from this discussion that the bargain we have outlined here is fundamentally multilateral,i n
that it cannot be broken down into a series of bilateral bargains that is each mutually beneﬁcial
to the parties involved. This is an inherent feature of any solution to the latecomers problem as
we have described that problem above, and it creates a special challenge for an institution such as
25It is also interesting to note that the eﬀort to reduce/eliminate export-enhancing agricultural subsidies and the
eﬀort to more fully integrate developing countries into the world trading system are being attempted in the same
round of GATT/WTO negotiations. There could of course be many reasons for this, but the interpretation we oﬀer
here is one of them.
26More speciﬁcally, and with reference to Figure 5, in the absence of SDT there are three strategies that would
become available for a developed country such as the United States to negotiate reductions in the tariﬀs of a developing
country such as Brazil. First, to the extent that Brazil is the traditional principal supplier of a good (say, good 
in Figure 5) into the US market, the existing US tariﬀ on this good is likely to be ineﬃciently high as a result of
the GATT/WTO’s historical reliance on SDT, and the United States can then engage Brazil in standard reciprocal
market access negotiations oﬀering cuts in the US tariﬀ on imports of good  in exchange for cuts in Brazil’s tariﬀ
(say, on imports of good  in Figure 5). This ﬁrst strategy may be available with regard to developed country
markets such as textiles and apparel, certain agricultural products, and footwear (though on the possible diﬃculties
of applying this strategy for textiles and apparel see note 14). Second, for agricultural goods where the United States
and Brazil are competing exporters into developed country markets such as the EU (say, good  in Figure 5), the
United States can oﬀer reductions in agricultural subsidies to Brazil in exchange for cuts in Brazil’s tariﬀ (on imports
of good  in Figure 5), as we have described in the text. These negotiations could beneﬁt both the United States and
Brazil, though the EU could be hurt without further multilateral policy adjustments. And third, for non-agricultural
goods where a developed country such as the EU is the traditional principal supplier into the US market (say, good
 in Figure 5) and where US tariﬀs are likely to be low as a result of commitments made in previous rounds of
GATT/WTO negotiations, the United States could in principle renegotiate with the EU on the treatment of good
, with the United States raising its tariﬀ binding and the EU lowering its export subsidy, so that the United States
could then engage Brazil in standard reciprocal market access negotiations oﬀering cuts in the US tariﬀ on imports
of good  in exchange for cuts in Brazil’s tariﬀ (on imports of good  in Figure 5). Once again, the EU could be hurt
without further multilateral policy adjustments. In theor y ,t h i st h i r ds t r a t e g yp r o v i d e sad i r e c tw a yt oa d d r e s st h e
latecomers problem and allow developing countries to be integrated into the world trading system where the ﬁrst two
strategies are unavailable, though in practice the prospect of tariﬀ renegotiations between developed countries raises
a host of issues from which our simple theoretical treatment abstracts, which is why we present this third possibility
as of mostly pedagogical value.
23the GATT/WTO with a long history of solving problems via a collection of largely bilateral and
mutually beneﬁcial bargains.
Finally, it is worth emphasizing the one key change in the substance of the current approach
to Doha Round negotiations that is required for the economic interpretation that we have sketched
above to hold together: SDT must be rejected, and developing countries (Brazil in Figure 5) must
come to the bargaining table in markets where they are large and oﬀer reciprocal tariﬀ cuts of their
own. Absent tariﬀ cuts from developing countries, the analysis we have sketched above cannot lend
support to the basic Doha approach to negotiations.27
5C o n c l u s i o n
A fundamental objective of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations is to improve the trading
prospects of developing countries. The 2001 declaration from the WTO Ministerial Conference
in Doha, Qatar, commits the member governments to negotiations aimed at substantial improve-
ments in market access with a view to phasing out export subsidies, while embracing special and
diﬀerential treatment for developing countries as an integral part of all elements of the negotiations.
The main message of this paper comes in three parts. First, these stated aims are incompatible
from the perspective of our economic analysis; thus, if these aims are pursued as stated, then we
conclude that they are unlikely to deliver the meaningful trade gains for developing countries that
the WTO membership seeks. Second, in attempting to integrate its developing country membership
into the world trading system, the WTO may face a “latecomers” problem that, while occurring
also in earlier rounds, is unprecedented in its scale in the Doha Round, and which could potentially
account for the current impasse. And third, we argue that if the Round maintains its stated aims but
moves away from the non-reciprocal special-and-diﬀerential treatment norm as the cornerstone of
the approach to meeting developing country needs in the WTO, and if developing countries prepare,
in markets where they are large, to come to the bargaining table and to negotiate reciprocally with
each other and with developing nations, then it might be possible to break the impasse at Doha,
to address the latecomers problem, and to deliver trade gains for developing countries.
We close with two ﬁnal observations. First, our diagnosis of the underlying reason for the
current stalemate in the Doha Round has much inc o m m o nw i t ht h ev i e w se x p r e s s e di nar e c e n t
speech by WTO Director General Pascal Lamy on this point:
“In trade matters, we need to address competing views among governments as to
what constitutes a fair distribution of rights and obligations within the trading sys-
tem. Before the WTO was established in 1995 there was, in broad terms, an arrange-
27The other change we have suggested above — that the agriculture negotiations, which are currently focused on
negotiating reductions in agricultural export-enhancing subsidies in exchange for reductions in agricultural import
tariﬀs, should be reoriented toward a focus on traditional market-access bargaining — can from the perspective we oﬀer
here be seen less as a change of substance than a change in emphasis and interpretation within a broader package,
because within this broader package export-enhancing subsidies are still cut, but the purpose of an agreement to reduce
these subsidies is now solely to facilitate market access (i.e., tariﬀ) negotiations between developed and developing
countries.
24ment whereby developed countries agreed to open their markets, while more emphasis
was placed on special and diﬀerential treatment for developing countries. Developing
countries were not called upon to open their markets in a substantial manner. This
arrangement reﬂected basic diﬀerences in development levels and capacities.
“Over time, the diﬀerences between developed and at least some developing countries
have narrowed, and with it the rather simple dichotomy upon which the GATT trad-
ing system rested. As developing-country growth has outstripped developed-country
growth and the gap has narrowed, it is becoming harder to ﬁnd a balance of rights and
obligations that is regarded as legitimate and fair in the eyes of all parties concerned.
These tensions had already begun to manifest themselves well before the creation of the
WTO and China’s accession, but they have clearly increased since.
“Underlying all this is the question of what constitutes reciprocity. For some, the
emerging economies have attained a level of competitiveness and eﬃciency in key sec-
tors that warrants treating reciprocity as parity in obligations. Others emphasize that
emerging economies still face formidable development challenges in many areas of their
economies and are still far from enjoying the per capita income levels and standard of
living of those in industrialized economies. In this world, it is argued, treating reci-
procity as equality of obligations is not appropriate, fails to meet a fairness standard,
and handicaps development policies.
“It is not my role as Director-General to take a position on this issue, but in many
ways, it is this that has made it impossible for us so far to reach agreement on a big
package of new regulations of world trade in the Doha Round.” (WTO, 2011).
Achieving a shared diagnosis of the problems that have led to the impasse at Doha is crucial if
WTO-member governments are to move forward on a solution to that impasse. Our economic
analysis provides strong support for the views expressed by Director General Lamy in this regard.
At the same time, our analysis suggests a possible bridge between the opposing positions described
by Director General Lamy regarding what constitutes “a fair distribution of rights and obligations
within the trading system”: such a bridge might be built, not by equating reciprocity with a “parity
in obligations” per se (though that could be the outcome of reciprocal negotiations), but rather
by building on the way that developed countries have traditionally harnessed reciprocity in their
GATT/WTO market access negotiations with each other and ﬁnding ways to harness reciprocity
as a means to achieve meaningful market access commitments for emerging/developing economies
as well.
And ﬁnally, we note that the relatively successful experience of the negotiations regarding the
revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the text of which is now agreed in
principle, is potentially relevant for the arguments we have put forward above.28 In particular, as
Anderson (2011) describes, in their GPA negotiations WTO-member governments have adopted a
28We thank our discussant Robert Anderson for bringing this negotiation to our attention and providing the relevant
mapping to our analysis.
25novel approach to SDT that allows reciprocity to be maintained in the negotiations between devel-
oped and developing countries. If our arguments are correct, this feature of the GPA negotiations,
in combination with the fact that the GPA negotiations did not start from a substantial asymmetry
of commitments across existing developed and developing country members and so did not face the
kind of “latecomers” problem that we have argued confronts the Doha Round negotiators, may
help to explain the relative success achieved by the GPA negotiators as compared to that achieved
to date in the Doha Round.
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incidence on a specific list of products.52 Although the data are not strictly comparable with those of 
Woytinski, they nevertheless confirm the general view of the existence of a low tariff country group 
(rates varying between 5 and 9 per cent, comprising the Benelux countries, Denmark and Sweden) and 
another group with distinctively higher tariff rates, ranging from 16 to 24 per cent (including the United 
States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and Italy in ascending order). The industrial countries’ 
arithmetic average of applied tariff rates was still between 10 and 20 per cent (see Appendix Table 7). 
These estimates also include in principal the cuts made in the third round (Torquay).
These average tariff rate estimates reported in 1950 and 1952 permit a plausible guess about the tariff 
average prevailing before the first Round. On the assumption that the average tariff cut of the industrial 
countries did not exceed that of the United States (i.e 27 per cent cumulative between 1947 and 1950 
or 31 per cent cumulative between 1947 and 1952 ) it is most likely that in 1947 the average tariff rate 
was situated in a range between 20 and 30 per cent. This estimate differs sharply from the widely quoted 
40 per cent tariff average for industrial countries. Although this estimate is frequently reported there 
is no study to the knowledge of the authors of this report which indicates the source and the method 
(country coverage, product coverage, type of tariff) of how this average rate was estimated.53
Table 5
G A T T / W T O–6 0y e a r so ft a r i f fr e d u c t i o n s
(MFN tariff reduction of industrial countries for industrial products (excl. petroleum))
Implementation 
Period
Round covered Weighted tariff reduction      Weights based on MFN  
imports (year)
1948 Geneva (1947) -26  1939
1950 Annecy (1949)  -3  1947
1952 Torquay (1950-51) -4 1949
1956-58 Geneva (1955-56)  -3  1954
1962-64 Dillon Round (1961-62)  -4  1960
1968-72 Kennedy Round (1964-67)  -38  1964
1980-87 Tokyo Round (1973-79) -33  1977(or 1976)
1995-99 Uruguay Round (1986-94) -38  1988(or 1989)
Note: Tariff reductions for the first five rounds refer to the United States only. The calculation of average rates of reductions are 
weighted by MFN import values.
Source:
Geneva (1947): US Tariff Commission, Operations of the Trade Agreements Program, June 1934-April 1948, Part III Table 16 (non-
agricultural products).
Annecy (1949): US Tariff Commission, Operations of the Trade Agreements Program, April 1949-June 1950, Chapter 5, Tables 7 
and 8. Refers to all products.
Torquay (1950-51): United States Tariff Commission, Fifth Report, July 1951-June 1952, Chapter 4, pp.149-170, Tables 5 and 6.
Geneva (1955-56): Estimates based on United States Tariff Commission, Ninth Report, July 1955-June 1956, Chapter 3, pp.100-
108 and US Department of State Publication 6348, Commercial Policy Series 158, released June 1956.
Dillon Round (1961-62): Estimates based on United States Tariff Commission, 13th Report, July 1959-June 1960, pp.17-29 and US 
Department of State Publication 7408, Commercial Policy Series 194, released July 1962.
Kennedy Round (1964-67): Preeg, E.(1970), Traders and Diplomats, Tables A2 and A3. Refers to four markets: United States, 
Japan, EEC(6) and United Kingdom. Own calculations for the aggregate based on 1964 M.F.N. import values.
Tokyo Round (1973-79): GATT, COM.TD/W/315, 4.7.1980, p.20 and 21 and own calculations. Refers to eight markets (United 
States, EEC(9), Japan, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland).
Uruguay Round (1986-94): GATT, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, November 1994, 
Appendix Table 5 and own calculations. Refers to eight markets (United States, EU(12), Japan, Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland).
52  Tariff average for the same products retained in the League of Nations tariff estimates for 1913 and 1925 and based 
on arithmetic average for these 78 commodities (corresponding to 530 items).
53 To our knowledge this pre-GATT average tariff rate was reported for the first time in the World Bank Development Report 
1987 (p. 134): “successive rounds of negotiations in GATT had cut tariffs on trade in manufactures from an average level 
of 40 per cent in 1947 to between 6 per cent and 8 per cent for most industrial countries even before the last round of 
multilateral trade negotiations (the Tokyo Round, 1973-79) had taken place”. No details are provided on sources and methods 
used to arrive at this number of 40 per cent. Thereafter, this number was taken up by many other authors in books, articles 








































































































































































With the Uruguay Round, the data situation improved considerably.89 With regard to tariffs in particular,
the GATT/WTO Secretariat’s Integrated Data Base allowed detailed calculations to be made electronically
for 27 out of a total of 94 developing economy participants. Using these data, a comparison can be
made between pre- and post-Uruguay Round binding coverage. On average, the developing countries
in the sample substantially increased their binding coverage. Their share of bound lines in all agricultural
tariff lines increased from 17 per cent before the Uruguay Round to 100 per cent. For non-agricultural
products, the binding coverage expressed in percentage of all non-agricultural tariff lines increased from
21 to 73 per cent. As can be seen from Table 9, these averages hide considerable differences between
regions.90 While almost all Latin American countries bound all their industrial tariff lines at a generally
uniform ceiling level, African and Asian countries adopted more diverse strategies. Most of them left a
significant number of lines unbound.
Comparisons of tariff levels over time raise a number of difficulties. While comparisons between pre-
Uruguay Round and post-Uruguay Round applied tariffs are relatively straightforward, changes in binding
coverage complicate comparisons between pre- and post-Uruguay Round averages of bound rates. In the
1990s, averages of bound tariffs were typically calculated across all tariff lines, bound and unbound, using
the applied duty in the base period for unbound lines. Nowadays, averages of bound rates are calculated
on bound rates only. These issues warrant for considerable caution in interpreting the statistics, in making
comparisons across countries and over time and in making comparisons with previous estimates.
A major achievement of the Uruguay Round was the Agreement on Agriculture and the progress made
towards bringing agriculture back into the realm of multilateral trade rules. Although agriculture had
always been covered by the GATT, prior to the WTO, the rules that applied to agricultural primary
products deviated from the general rules.91 In the lead up to the Uruguay Round negotiations, it became
increasingly evident that the causes of disarray in agriculture went beyond problems with market access
strictly defined. To get to the root of the problem, Members decided to tackle market access, domestic
support and export subsidies jointly. A comprehensive discussion of the effects of the Agreement on
Agriculture on developing countries is beyond the scope of this Report. This subsection focuses on
changes in tariff bindings and tariff levels. However, it is important to keep in mind that this only
89 Uruguay Round market access commitments have been extensively documented elsewhere. See for instance WTO
(2001a), OECD (1999), Martin and Winters (1996), GATT (1994).
90 Averages calculated on a sample of 55 countries (counting the 12 Members of the EU individually) including 27 of the
93 developing economy participants in the Uruguay Round. See the discussion in GATT (1994).













       
 













   
   
Table 9 
Pre- and post-Uruguay Round binding coverage for agricultural and non-agricultural products 
Agricultural products  Non Agricultural products 
Percentage of tariffs  Percentage of imports  Percentage of tariffs  Percentage of imports 
lines bound  under bound rates  lines bound  under bound rates 
Pre UR  Post UR  Pre UR  Post UR  Pre UR  Post UR  Pre UR  Post UR 
Developing economies  17  100  22  100  21  73  13  61 
Transition economies  57  100  59  100  73  98  74  96 
Latin America  36  100  74  100  38  100  57  100 
Central Europe  49  100  54  100  63  98  68  97 
Africa  12  100  8  100  13  69  26  90 
Asia  15  100  36  100  16  68  32  70 









































































































































































Status of tariff bindings: developed countries and industrial products, 1972-2000
(Percentage – Coverage based on tariff lines)
Post-Kennedy Round Post-Tokyo Round Post-Uruguay Round
1972 1987 2000
Canada 74-74 98-98 99.7
United States 100-100 100-100 100.0
Japan 90-91 97-97 99.6
EU a 98-99 99-99 100.0
Denmark 97-91 - -
United Kingdom 93-94 - -
Austria 86-87 96-96 -
Finland 55-86 97-97 -
Sweden 94-95 97-97 -
Norway 79-81 95-95 100.0
Switzerland 98-98 99-99 99.7
Australia ... 11-17 96.5
New Zealand ... 39-51 99.5
a Refers to EEC(6) for Post-Kennedy, to EEC(9) for Post-Tokyo and to EU(15) for Post-Uruguay Round (including ITA).
Note: Lower end of binding coverage range refers to totally bound tariff lines while upper end includes partially bound tariff lines.
Source: GATT (1971) Basic Documentation for the Tariff Study. Supplementary Tables, Geneva. (Kennedy Round). GATT (1987), Importance 
des consolidations tarifaires établies dans le cadre de l’Accord Général, GATT document: MTN.GNG/NG1/WW/2/Rev.1*, 27 mars 1987.   
(Tokyo Round).  WTO (2007), World Tariff Profiles.  (Uruguay Round).WTO (2007), World Tariff Profiles.  (Uruguay Round).
Appendix Table 9
Status of tariff bindings: developed countries and agricultural products, 1987 and 2000
(Percentage – Coverage based on tariff lines)
Post-Tokyo Round  Post-UR Round 
Canada 90-91 100.0
United States 90-93 100.0
Japan 60-63 100.0





Switzerland 44-46 < 100.0
Australia 26-32 100.0
New Zealand 48-54 100.0
a Refers to  EEC(9) for Post-Tokyo and to EU(15) for Post-UR Round (incl. ITA).
Note: Lower end of binding coverage range refers to totally bound tariff lines while upper end includes partially bound tariff lines.
Source: GATT (1987), Importance des consolidations tarifaires établies dans le cadre de l’Accord Général; GATT document: MTN.
GNG/NG1/WW/2/Rev.1*, 27 mars 1987 (Tokyo Round);  WTO (2007), World Tariff Profiles (Uruguay Round).References
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